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Evaluating the Performance of the U.S. Social Safety Net  
in the Great Recession
The following provides an assessment of the performance of both individual safety net programs and the cumulative impact of all safety net benefits and tax 
credits on household incomes in the early years during and following the 2007-09 
recession. Specifically, I examine the extent to which various benefits and tax credits 
have moderated the impact of earnings losses for households in different positions 
in the income distribution, with special attention to the experiences of low-income 
households. In addition, I examine whether these moderating impacts differ for 
households of various racial/ethnic compositions, female-headed households, and 
residents of states with more and less accessible safety net programs. Overall, safety 
net programs have very significantly mitigated what would otherwise have been 
substantial, and in the case of lower income households, severe losses in income. This 
has been especially true for many working poor and lower middle class households 
who have benefited from their eligibility for a range of benefits and credits that are 
conditional on employment or earnings. However, heavy reliance on employment 
conditional benefits has reduced access to this income support for households with 
barriers to labor force participation, such as very poor female-headed households. In 
addition, across the income distribution non-white households have experienced both 
disproportionately large earnings losses and less receipt of compensating benefits and 
credits. Finally, the availability, accessibility, and generosity of benefits and credits 
varies so substantially across states that very poor households have experienced 
both the largest and the smallest declines in total household income depending on 
state of residence. In closing, I stress that many of the programs that have done the 
most to mitigate earnings losses were either temporary (tax credits) or exhaustible 
(Unemployment Insurance, TANF) and are not structured to accommodate a 
prolonged employment crisis such as that we are currently experiencing. Given the 
dramatic erosion of labor force participation among low-income households and the 
exhaustibility of the programs that have expanded the most since 2007, I expect the 
capacity of current safety net programs to mitigate income losses to falter substantially 
and potentially disastrously in coming years.
Abstract
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The prolonged period of high unemployment and 
weak economic growth during and in the years 
following the 2007–2009 recession constitute both 
a human tragedy and a rather extreme test of the 
responsiveness of safety net programs in the United 
States. For decades, various scholars, researchers, 
and politicians have remarked on the manner 
in which the U.S. social safety net has become 
increasingly frayed. The following provides an 
assessment of the performance of both individual 
safety net programs, such as Unemployment 
Insurance and the Earned Income Tax Credit, and 
the cumulative impact of all safety net benefits and 
credits on household incomes in the early years 
during and following the recession. Specifically, 
I examine the extent to which various benefits 
and tax credits have moderated the impacts of 
earnings losses for households in different positions 
in the income distribution, with special attention 
to the experiences of low-income households. 
Additionally, I examine whether these moderating 
impacts differ for households of various racial/
ethnic compositions, female-headed households, 
and residents of states with more and less accessible 
safety net programs. Along the way, I identify 
the primary programs and credits supporting 
household incomes and evaluate program 
responsiveness in the context of the deepest 
recession since the Great Depression. Central 
findings including the following:
•	 On	average,	it	appears	that	in	light	of	the	
dramatic declines in earnings for low-
income households U.S. safety net programs 
have very significantly mitigated income 
losses during the first two years of the 
recession.
•	 For	lower	income	households	(the	bottom	
20% of households in terms of income), 
Unemployment Insurance and SNAP are 
the programs that have most substantially 
replaced earnings lost between 2007 
and 2009. Importantly, for these same 
households receipt of income by way of the 
Earned Income Tax Credit has fallen and 
benefits received via Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families has remained essentially 
unchanged. 
•	 Both	the	magnitude	of	earnings	losses	
and the extent to which benefits and 
credits have moderated these losses differ 
significantly across households of different 
racial/ethnic compositions. In brief, poorer 
non-white households have experienced 
a dramatic collapse in earnings and non-
white households, in general, have had less 
of their earnings losses replaced by benefits 
or credits than either white or Hispanic 
households. As a consequence of both 
larger earnings losses and lower receipt 
of benefits and credits, middle class non-
white households have experienced larger 
reductions in total income than poor non-
white, Hispanic, or white households.  
•	 Despite	substantial	earnings	losses,	working	
poor and middle class female-headed 
households have experience a remarkable 
stability of incomes over the first two years 
of the recession as a result of increases 
in income received via both benefits and 
tax credits. In contrast, very poor female-
headed households experienced reductions 
in income from the EITC as labor force 
participation declined. Additionally, total 
income received by poor single mothers 
from TANF actually declined, albeit slightly, 
between 2007 and 2009. 
•	 Substantial	differences	in	the	generosity	
and accessibility of a small number of 
programs (SSI, UI, and especially TANF) 
appear to drive the significantly different 
degrees to which state safety net programs 
have mitigated earnings losses for very poor 
households. This divergence is most striking 
for households at the 10th percentile 
where total income losses were roughly 
7%, between 2007 and 2009, in the states 
characterized by low safety net accessibility 
as compared to losses of just over 1% in 
states with more accessible programs.
Introduction and Summary of Findings
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Falling Household Incomes and Rising 
Poverty
The national poverty rate rose to 15.1 percent 
in 2010 from 12.5 percent in 2007. This poverty 
rate indicates that 46.2 million Americans 
were below the official poverty line in 2010. This 
spike in poverty is a direct result of dramatic 
reductions in household earnings, an experience 
that hit lower income households especially hard.  
Figure 1 displays the percentage change in total 
adjusted household incomes for households at 
various percentiles between 2007 and 2009.1 All 
of the following figures, including Figure 1, are 
restricted to households in which the household 
head is older than 24 and younger than 60 years of 
age. I focus on these “working age” households to 
remove the low household incomes that might be 
experienced by the very elderly or college students 
as such individuals may not be participating 
(or participating only marginally) in the labor 
market. Figure 1 indicates that total household 
incomes have fallen more substantially for working 
age households in the lower end of the income 
distribution2. In just two years household incomes 
fell over 5% for households at the 10th percentile 
as compared with losses of less than 2% at the 70th 
and 80th percentiles. 
While informative, figures displaying percent 
changes in household incomes obscure the actual 
value of household incomes we are examining 
here. Table 1 presents the dollar values of 
household incomes that underlay the percent 
change contained in Figures 1, 2, & 3 in the form of 
household income for a family of three. Total annual 
income for a working-age household of three at the 
10th percentile fell from $20,528 to $19,385 between 
2007 and 2009 while income for a family at the 80th 
percentile fell from $103,611 to $102,065. Even if 
income losses were proportional across households, 
which they were decidedly not, the qualitative 
impacts of such losses are more acute for lower-
income households. 
The Impact of Social Welfare Benefits and 
Tax Credits
One way of measuring the impact of various welfare 
benefits and tax credits is to examine household 
income in the absence of such benefits. Table 1 
presents these hypothetical household income 
figures and an estimate of household income with 
benefits. For comparison, Table 1 also contains the 
value of the actual total household income (from 
all sources including benefits) taking into account 
the impact of taxes and tax credits. This table 
makes clear the relative contributions of earnings, 
benefits, and tax credits to total household incomes 
and provides a sense of how these contributions 
vary across lower-income to wealthy households. 
It should be mentioned that the intent of these 
estimates is not to assert that 
household incomes would 
have actually been some 
specific value in the absence of 
government benefits and tax 
credits3. Rather, the intent of 
such estimates is to illustrate, 
roughly, both the magnitude 
of earnings losses experienced 
by households and the extent 
to which these losses have 
been buffered by safety net 
programs over the course of 
the recession.
Figure 2 captures both of 
these phenomena well, 
displaying the degree of 
change in household income 
Figure 1. Percent Change in Total Adjusted Household Income: 
2007–2009 (Householder Age 25-59)
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TABLE 1 Total Income for a Household of Three (2010 dollars; Householder Age 25–59)
Income Income   Total Income
Percentile Year
 Without Benefits/
Credits
With Benefits
 (With Benefits/
Credits)
10th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$13,100
$11,347
$8,814
$6,743
$18,958
$17,934
$17,099
$16,115
$20,528
$19,939
$19,385
20th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$29,044
$26,861
$24,638
22,690
$32,365
$30,955
$29,516
$28,169
$32,460
$31,368
$31,292
30th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$42,567
$39,972
$37,404
$35,943
$45,605
$43,135
$41,280
$40,000
$42,531
$40,774
$40,448
40th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$54,753
$52,463
$49,862
$48,801
$57,296
$54,762
$52,904
$51,962
$52,454
$50,508
$50,127
50th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$67,931
$64,915
$62,327
$61,440
$69,732
$67,155
$65,794
$64,841
$62,588
$60,706
$60,527
60th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$82,089
$79,142
$77,286
$76,210
$83,486
$81,123
$79,632
$78,386
$73,496
$71,748
$71,911
70th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$98,507
$95,436
$93,714
$93,081
$100,303
$97,327
$96,362
$95,280
$86,438
$84,624
$84,858
80th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$121,947
$118,677
$117,556
$116,351
$123,254
$120,318
$119,876
$118,317
$103,611
$101,348
$102,065
90th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$164,178
$160,579
$158,258
$156,314
$165,637
$162,386
$160,00
$158,421
$134,520
$131,895
$131,275
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between 2007 and 2009 both with and in the 
absence of benefits and credits. The majority of 
non-benefit/credit income for most families is 
garnered through their labor market earnings, 
but may be supplemented by income from child 
support, alimony, gifts, loans, and so on. However, 
for convenience, this non-benefit/credit income will 
be referred to as either “market income” or simply 
“earnings” in the following. Figure 3 displays change 
in both household income without benefits or 
credits and change in income with benefits between 
2007 and 2010. The data required to account for the 
Figure 2. Household Income Losses With and Without Benefits or Credits: 
2007–2009 (Householder Age 25-59)
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Figure 3. Household Income Losses With and Without Benefits: 2007–2010 (Householder Age 25-59)
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impact of taxes and tax credits in 2010 have not yet 
been released. 
These two figures indicate clearly that while all 
households have experienced losses in earnings 
since the onset of the recession, the magnitude of 
these losses as a proportion of total earnings have 
been significantly larger in the lower end of the 
income distribution. Households at the 10th and 
20th percentiles experienced losses of 49% and 
22% in market income between 2007 and 2010, 
respectively, while households at the 80th and 90th 
percentiles lost roughly 5% over the same period. 
The receipt of both benefits and tax credits has 
very significantly moderated these rather dramatic 
losses in earnings for lower-income households. 
Between	2007	and	2009	market	income	losses	of	
33%, 15%, and 12% percent at the 10th, 20th, and 
30th percentiles translated in into total income 
losses of only 5.6%, 3.6%, and 4.9%, respectively, 
as a result of the receipt of benefits and credits. 
Figures 4 and 5 display these impacts in actual 
dollars, presenting the composition of total annual 
households incomes for a household of three 
at the 10th percentile and the 20th percentiles 
respectively. For a household of three at the 10th 
percentile estimated annual labor market earnings 
fell from $13,100 in 2007 to $8,814 in 2009, a 
significant loss. However, due to a compensating 
expansion of income from benefits and credits total 
household income only fell by $1,143 over these 
same years. On average, it appears that in light of 
the dramatic declines in earnings for low-income 
households U.S. safety net programs have very 
substantially mitigated income losses. Whether 
this is true for all types of households and whether 
we can expect this to continue are two important 
issues that will be addressed below. 
What Constitutes the Contemporary  
Safety Net?
We have seen the significant impacts of benefits 
and credits on total household income for low-
income households, but through what programs 
are households receiving these benefits? Figure 6 
displays the percentage of total income received via 
benefits and tax credits by working-age households 
in the bottom quintile of the income distribution 
in both 2007 and 2009. In 2007, of all the income 
received by households in the bottom 20% roughly 
a quarter came from benefits and credits and 
69% of their income was earned through wages 
and salaries4. I provide 2007 proportions both for 
comparison and to illustrate the composition of the 
benefit/credit mix for low-income families in a peak 
business cycle year (the average unemployment 
rate in 2007 was 4.6%). The actual combination 
of benefits or credits received by any particular 
household will vary dramatically depending on the 
composition and circumstances of the household. 
The main goal here is to get a sense of the relative 
magnitude of the contribution of various safety net 
programs to the incomes of poorer households.
Figure 4. Composition of Total Annual 
Income for a Household of Three at the 
10th Percentile (2010 dollars)
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*Data on tax credits are currently not avaliable
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Figure 5. Composition of Total Annual 
Income for a Household of Three at the 
20th Percentile (2010 dollars)
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*Data on tax credits are currently not avaliable
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In 2007, the program that makes the largest 
contribution to low-income household incomes is 
Social Security. This is presumably a situation where 
an elderly individual or relative is a member of a 
household with a working age head and their Social 
Security benefits contribute to (or is here counted 
as part of) total household income. Next, roughly 
6.5% of income was received by way of the federal 
tax code with nearly 90% of that income received 
by way of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The 
third largest contribution is from SSI, comprising 
4.6% of total income in the lowest quintile in 2007. 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 
Unemployment Insurance, and Disability benefits 
each comprised roughly 1% of total income. While 
no doubt important to their respective recipients, 
the remaining benefits and credits (Veterans, 
Survivors, Workers’ Compensation, and state tax 
credits) comprise a very small share of all transfers 
received by the bottom 20% of households. 
Figure 6 also provides the proportions of income 
from various programs in 2009. While this 
gives us a sense of the contribution of various 
programs in 2009, Figure 6 is an imperfect guide 
to understanding changes in program use and 
expenditures between 2007 and 2009. As earnings 
have fallen substantially the proportion of income 
from benefits consequently increases even if the 
amount of income received via a particular program 
remained constant year-to-year. In 2009 households 
in the bottom quintile received roughly a third of 
their income from benefits and credits and 59% 
of their income from wages and salaries. In terms 
of changes in program utilization, the only firm 
conclusion that we can draw from Figure 6 is that 
income received from Unemployment Insurance 
payments has increased dramatically. It also 
appears that income from federal tax credits has 
increased, although to much less of an extent. For 
the remaining programs it is not possible to discern 
whether the proportion of income received has 
increased as a result of increased receipt of that 
benefit or as a consequence of the proportion of 
benefits increasing mechanically as earnings fell.
In order to address this, Figure 7 presents the 
percent change, between 2007 and 2009, in total 
income received through various programs by 
the bottom 20% of households. In this case we are 
looking at the change in raw (constant) dollars to 
get a sense of how much the total expenditures 
received by the bottom 20% of households within 
these various programs has changed since the 
onset of the recession. Figure 7 does not include UI 
as the total income received through this program 
by the bottom quintile increased 386% between 
2007 and 2009. Otherwise, we see increases only in 
total income received through federal and state tax 
credits, SSI, TANF, and Veterans’ benefits.
Figure 6. Percent of Total Income From Benefits 
and Credits: Bottom 20% of Households 2007 and 
2009 (Householder Age 25-59)
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Federal and State Tax Credits 
As mentioned above, in 2007 nearly 90% of 
the income received via federal tax credits by 
households in the bottom quintile was received 
through the Earned Income Tax Credit. The number 
of taxpayers claiming the EITC increased from 
24.6 million in 2007 to just over 27 million in 2009 
as more individuals became eligible as a result 
of	reduced	earnings	(Bryan	2009;	Bryan	2011).	
Correspondingly, the total value of the national tax 
expenditure on the EITC increased from $48.5 to 
$59.2 billion over the same years. However, Figure 
7 indicates that the total value of income reaching 
the bottom 20% of households via this specific tax 
credit has fallen by over 10%. Presumably, this is a 
consequence of a significant proportion of lower-
income households losing eligibility for this credit 
due to a lack of earnings.  While income received 
via the EITC has fallen, households in the bottom 
quintile did experience an increase in income 
received through federal tax credits between 2007 
and 2009. This is due to the creation of a number 
of temporary tax credits and cuts, primarily the 
2009 Economic Recovery Payments and the Making 
Work Pay credit that was made available to working 
individuals in 2009 and 2010. 
The fact that income received by way of the EITC 
has fallen for low-income households is not 
surprising given widespread job losses. This specific 
development highlights a major shortcoming 
inherent in the ability of earnings conditional 
subsidies to reach the poorest households during 
recessions. For households at the very bottom of the 
income distribution the impact of the EITC is pro-
cyclical in contrast to the counter-cyclical nature of 
traditional welfare programs. This is not a critique 
of the EITC itself, as it constitutes a major source 
of support for low-income working households 
and is a highly desirable program in many regards. 
Rather, the point is simply that safety net programs 
which are earnings or employment conditional 
will be less effective at reaching poor households in 
the context of very high unemployment, especially 
unemployment of significant duration such as we 
are currently experiencing.
Finally, a quick note on state tax credits.  While 
the total value of income received through state 
tax credits is rather small, Figure 7 understates 
the impact for households that live in one of the 23 
states that provide a state earned income tax credit. 
Overall however, the amount of income received by 
households in the bottom 20% by way of state tax 
credit is both very minimal and has expanded only 
modesty. We will return to the impact of state tax 
credits below.  
SSI and TANF
Increased expenditures through SSI are not 
surprising, as the population of eligible disabled 
individuals has undoubtedly increased as earnings 
have fallen over the course of the recession. 
Figure 7. Percent Change in Total Value of Transfers Received via Benefits and Credits between 
2007-2009: Bottom 20% of Households (Householder Age 25-59)
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However, more surprising is the incredibly small 
increase in the total value of TANF benefits received 
by households in the bottom 20%: roughly 2.5% 
between 2007 and 2009. This underlines how 
radically welfare reform reshaped the nature of 
AFDC a traditional counter-cyclical anti-poverty 
program. This is not to say that TANF has become 
completely unresponsive, the number of TANF 
recipients increased 6.6% between 2007 and 
2009 and another 5.3% between 2009 and 2010. 
However, the relatively minor role this program 
now plays as a component of the U.S. safety net 
is a direct result of major changes in the late-
1990s and beyond including: the erosion of benefit 
values, lifetime limits, and changes in eligibility 
requirements (Danziger 2010). In the case of new 
eligibility requirements, the widespread use of work 
requirements further undermines the accessibility 
of these benefits especially in the context of an 
employment crisis.
The Role of SNAP
So far we have not mentioned Supplement Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits, often referred 
to as food stamps. A relatively under recognized 
aspect of social assistance in the current downturn 
is the dramatic expansion of both expenditures 
on, and the number of recipients of, SNAP benefits. 
The number of SNAP recipients more than doubled 
between 2007 and 2010.  In 2010, 40.3 million 
program participants received $64.7 billion in 
benefits, an average of $134 in benefits a month per 
person (USDA 2011). Technically, SNAP benefits 
are “in-kind” (can only be used to purchase food) 
and do not constitute income per se.  However, in 
practice SNAP payments are income-like and free 
actual income for other uses. Figure 8 presents the 
same information on the composition of benefits 
received by the bottom 20% of households as  
Figure 6, but considers SNAP payments as a source 
of income (In addition, Social Security payment are 
removed from the graph, but not the estimates). 
SNAP payments represent a major source of 
financial support for households in the bottom 
quintile with these benefits comprising 6.4% of 
total household income, if considered income, in 
2009. This is nearly identical to the share of income 
received through all federal tax credits and larger 
than the share received by the bottom 20% through 
Unemployment Insurance.    
Holes in the Net? Safety Net Access by 
Race/Ethnicity, Family Structure, and 
Location
Above it was demonstrated that transfers and 
credits combined have very significantly moderated 
the impact of earnings losses on total household 
incomes.  So far, the figures examined have 
characterized the experiences of all working-
age households. However, it is the case that an 
individual’s race, ethnicity, family structure, and 
state of residence may all impact both labor market 
experiences and the accessibility of particular 
benefits or credits. 
Figure 8. Percent of Total Income from Various 
Benefits and Credits: Bottom 20% of Households, 
2007 and 2009 (Householder Age 25-59)
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Race & Ethnicity 
Beginning	with	differences	in	experiences	along	
racial and ethnic lines, Figure 9 displays the percent 
change in total household income between 2007 
and 2009 for working-age households where the 
household head is either white and not Hispanic, 
Hispanic regardless of race, or simply non-white5.  
The percentiles in this figure indicate the position 
of the household among all households of the 
same	racial	or	ethnic	category;	for	example,	the	
percentiles for white households indicate the value 
of household incomes for white households at 
various positions in the distribution of all white 
households. Consequently, the percent changes in 
Figures 9-12 are changes relative to different income 
levels in 2007.  Table 2 provides examples of these 
different income levels for a household of three 
in each of the three racial/ethnic categories. As 
with Figure 1 the changes captured in Figure 9 are 
changes in total income from all sources.   
The experience of the recession, economically 
speaking, has differed substantially along racial 
and ethnic lines. Among white households the 
proportion of income lost between 2007 and 2009 
tends to decline the higher one is in the income 
distribution (with the exception of households at the 
80th and 90th percentiles). Curiously, for non-white 
households this pattern is largely reversed with 
the size of income losses, as a proportion of total 
income, increasing up to the 60th percentile. In 
contrast, Hispanic households, with the exception 
of households at the 10th percentile, have overall 
experienced a remarkable stability in earnings 
between 2007 and 2009.     
In order to understand these different patterns of 
income losses, let’s begin by examining households 
at the 10th percentile of their respective racial or 
ethic categories. Figure 9 indicates that relative to 
household incomes in 2007 both white and Hispanic 
households experienced a nearly identical 5.4% 
decline in total income, while non-white households 
experienced a 3% decline.  Table 2 helps us 
decompose the contributions of changes in earnings 
and benefits/credits to these developments. First, 
we should note that total household income for 
white working-age households at the 10th percentile 
was nearly twice the income received by non-
white households in 2007: $25,878 and $13,522 
respectively for a household of three. A Hispanic 
household of three at the 10th percentile earned 
$15,734 in 2007. The fact that total income fell by a 
smaller proportion among non-white households 
Figure 9. Change in Total Household Income by Race/Ethnicity: 2007-2009 (Householder Age 25-59) 
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TABLE 2 Total Household Income for a Family of Three by Race & Ethnicity  
(2010 dollars; Householder Age 25–59)
White &
Not Hispanic
 Hispanic
(Any Race)
Non-White
Percentile Year Income Without Benefits/Credits
10th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$19,154
$17,665
$14,103
$12,000
$10,342
$7,955
$6,663
$6,032
$3,652
$1,499
$88
$0
20th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$38,308
$35,369
$32,613
$30,900
$19,349
$17,488
$16,205
$15,309
$18,431
$16,239
$13,797
$11,284
30th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$51,780
$49,553
$46,188
$45,040
$26,065
$24,983
$23,653
$22,517
$29,789
$27,381
$25,030
$23,500
40th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$64,495
$61,848
$59,375
$58,788
$33,748
$32,637
$30,870
$30,000
$41,060
$38,273
$36,051
$34,639
50th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$77,394
$74,603
$72,335
$72,000
$42,549
$40,607
$38,995
$38,665
$53,070
$49,463
$47,369
$45,033
60th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$91,219
$88,331
$87,258
$86,603
$52,660
$50,348
$49,037
$48,497
$66,352
$61,864
$59,834
$58,870
70th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$108,690
$105,903
$104,340
$103,582
$63,847
$61,829
$61,300
$60,150
$82,100
$79,062
$75,831
$74,000
80th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$132,482
$128,874
$127,377
$126,462
$80,893
$78,054
$79,153
$77,649
$103,981
$100,290
$97,375
$95,460
90th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$177,978
$175,377
$170,014
$168,962
$109,701
$109,525
$107,887
$106,553
$140,780
$137,836
$137,481
$132,456
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TABLE 2 Total Household Income for a Family of Three by Race & Ethnicity  
(2010 dollars; Householder Age 25–59) continued
White &
Not Hispanic
 Hispanic
(Any Race)
Non-White
White &
Not Hispanic
 Hispanic
(Any Race)
Non-White
Income With Benefits Total Income (With Benefits/Credits)
$25,539
$24,490
$22,595
$21,334
 $13,692
$12,366
$12,220
$11,758
$12,667
$11,850
$11,473
$10,288
$25,878
$25,334
$24,482
$15,734
$14,501
$14,888
$13,522
$13,083
$13,116
$41,318
$39,419
$37,726
$36,157
$20,852
$19,625
$19,392
$18,590
$21,928
$21,076
$20,213
$18,881
$39,269
$37,875
$37,495
$23,463
$22,422
$23,553
$23,988
$22,733
$22,691
$54,726
$52,423
$50,242
$49,198
$27,363
$26,940
$26,259
$25,115
$32,515
$31,294
$29,458
$28,019
$49,802
$48,344
$47,625
 $29,141
$28,662
$29,606
$32,586
$31,534
$31,087
$66,583
$64,152
$62,534
$61,565
$35,747
$34,447
$33,495
$32,258
 $43,813
$40,796
$39,665
$37,974
$59,861
$58,302
$57,858
$35,319
$34,354
$34,889
$41,377
$38,965
$38,870
$79,161
$76,530
$75,434
$74,478
 $44,129
$42,397
$41,385
$40,800
$54,821
$52,113
$50,418
$48,990
$69,986
$68,244
$68,271
$42,366
$40,838
$41,317
$50,720
$47,675
$47,528
$92,873
$90,301
$89,069
$88,329
$54,176
$52,152
$52,308
$50,349
$68,458
$63,864
$62,282
$61,237
$80,727
$79,123
$79,180
$50,460
$48,795
$49,788
$61,598
$58,119
$57,410
$109,769
$107,009
$106,158
$105,175
$64,499
$63,441
$63,299
$61,969
$83,844
$80,740
$79,330
$76,943
$93,749
$91,718
$92,240
 $59,749
$58,678
$59,662
$73,407
$71,474
$70,931
$134,113
$131,158
$129,720
$128,677
$82,089
$80,101
$81,092
$79,400
$105,383
$102,411
$100,111
$97,980
$111,712
$108,679
$109,417
$73,455
$71,910
$73,975
$89,722
$87,610
$87,546
$180,088
$176,653
$172,526
$171,544
$111,276
$110,585
$110,118
$109,503
$141,982
$139,902
$140,261
$134,544
$143,553
$141,905
$140,392
$96,522
$96,280
$97,068
$115,482
$114,985
$115,839
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is not surprising given that these households had 
significantly less income to lose.  
Less expected are the dramatic differences in 
changes in earnings that have occurred along 
racial/ethnic lines, changes that are nearly 
completely obscured by the countervailing impacts 
of benefits and transfers. Market income for white 
households at the 10th percentile fell 26% between 
2007 and 2009 (for a family of three from $19,154 to 
$14,103). Hispanic households at the same percentile 
experienced a 36% reduction in earnings ($10,342 
to $6,663 for a family of three). Finally, non-white 
households at the 10th percentile started at a much 
lower market income level in 2007 and saw those 
earnings fall 97% over this two-year period. For 
a non-white family of three, the value of annual 
market income fell from $3,652 in 2007 to $88 in 
2009;	by	2010	earnings	for	non-white	households	at	
the 10th percentile fell to zero. Given this shocking 
collapse in earnings, it is rather incredible that we 
observe such mild decreases in total incomes for 
these households. 
Moving beyond these extremely poor households, 
Figures 10-12 characterize these impacts in percent 
changes for households within these three racial/
ethnic categories at the 20th percentile and above 
(The 10th percentile is omitted from these figures 
due to that fact that changes at the 10th percentile 
are so large that it makes it difficult to examine 
patterns at other points in the income distribution.). 
Earnings losses for both white and Hispanic 
households are very similar across the income 
distribution. With the sole exception of households 
at the 90th percentile, it is consistently the case that 
non-white households experienced significantly 
larger proportional reductions in earnings than 
white or Hispanic households. These larger losses 
in earnings help explain the trend, noted in Figure 
9, in which total income losses for non-white 
households were largest around the median and 
the 60th percentile. To illustrate, let us focus for 
a moment on a point of extreme contrast. At the 
60th percentile white households experienced 
total income losses on the order of 1.9% between 
2007 and 2009, while non-white households at the 
same percentile experienced a 6.8% loss in total 
household income. Driving these developments was 
a 4.3% decline in total market income (earnings) 
for white households, while earning fell more than 
twice as much, 9.8%, within non-white households. 
Earnings did fall more for non-white households, 
but it is also clear that the impact of benefits and 
transfers buffered those losses less substantially 
than was the case for white households.
However, this example is something of an apples-
to-oranges comparison, as we are comparing 
the income of a non-white household at the 
60th percentile of the distribution of non-white 
households with a white household at the 60th 
Figure 10. Change in White Household Income: 2007-2009 (Householder Age 25-59)
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percentile of all white households. A household 
of three with a non-white household head at the 
60th percentile of all working age non-white 
households earned approximately $66,352 in 
2007. The equivalent white household at the same 
percentile within the distribution of working 
age white households earned roughly $91,219 in 
2007. Given these differences in earnings levels, a 
more appropriate comparison is between a white 
household at the 40th percentile, earning $64,495 
in 2007, and a non-white household at the 60th 
percentile (earning $66,352). Figure 13 does just this 
comparing the percent change in income absent 
benefits or credits, income with benefits, and total 
income from all sources including benefits and 
credits for a white household at the 40th percentile 
of earnings, a non-white household at the 60th 
percentile, and a Hispanic household at the 70th 
percentile. A Hispanic household of three at the 
70th percentile earned $63,847 in 2007.
Figure 11. Change in Hispanic Household Income: 2007-2009 (Householder Age 25-59)
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Figure 12. Change in Non-White Household Income: 2007-2009 (Householder Age 25–59)
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Focusing first on the comparison 
between white and non-white 
households, while earnings 
losses are similar, 7.9% and 
9.8% respectively, the impacts 
of transfer and credits are more 
substantial for white households. 
For example, receipt of benefits 
reduced total income losses 
between 2007 and 2009 by 23% 
in white households as compared 
to 8.2% in non-white households. 
A detailed examination of shifts 
in the shares of income received 
through various benefits indicates 
that this development is almost 
entirely due to differences in 
the amount of income received 
through Unemployment 
Insurance.  The total share of 
income received from UI by the 
middle quintile6 of non-white 
households more than doubled, 
increasing by 222%, between 2007 
and 2009. However, for white 
households in an identical income 
range this share increased 370%. 
There are many factors that are likely contributing 
to these differences. For one, the fact that (up 
until a threshold) UI benefits are proportional to 
earnings means that racial differences in earnings 
will be reflected in the size of UI benefits. Further, 
unemployment benefits are often inaccessible 
to individuals with part-time jobs, inconsistent 
work, or unstable employment histories. For a 
wide variety of reasons, such characteristics 
disproportionately characterize the labor market 
experiences of minority workers. 
Continuing with our comparison in Figure 13 and 
turning to the impact of tax credits, we see that 
tax policy further reduces the extent of income 
losses by 45% for white households and 25% for 
non-white households. Compared to 2007, in 2009 
the proportion of income lost to taxes, especially 
federal taxes, has been reduced substantially for all 
households. Within this middle-income quintile, 
the reduction in the tax burden has been larger for 
white households than for minority households. 
While it is not possible here to disaggregate 
the specific tax deductions and credits driving 
this development, it is likely that the use of 
earnings conditional tax credits have contributed 
substantially to this development. Minority 
unemployment rates are consistently higher than 
that	of	whites	and	2009	was	not	an	exception;	
average unemployment rates for whites, Hispanics, 
and African-Americans were 7.2%, 11.3%, and 13.9% 
respectively.
Finally, we turn to the surprising finding of the 
remarkable stability in the incomes of many 
Hispanic households. Figure 13 indicates that the 
size of earnings losses for Hispanic households 
at the 70th percentile were roughly half those 
experienced by white households with comparable 
earnings. Given that earnings losses were smaller, 
this dramatically increased the capacity of benefits 
and credits to replace this lost income. In part, this 
same dynamic helps explain the stability of incomes 
for lower-income Hispanic households observed 
Figure 13. Change in Household Income With and Without Benefits or 
Credit by Race/Ethnicity (Householder Age 25–59)
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in Figure 9. For example, both white and Hispanic 
households at their respective 20th percentiles lost 
a similar proportion of market income between 
2007 and 2009: 15% and 16% declines. However, 
given the significant differences in income levels in 
2007, the raw dollar values of these earnings losses 
are substantially different. Specifically, for a white 
working-age household of three a 15% decline in 
a 2007 income of $38,308 is a loss of $5,695. For a 
comparable Hispanic family at the 20th percentile a 
16% loss on a 2007 income of $19,349 is $3,143. 
In addition to income losses for Hispanic 
households being smaller in raw dollars, 
lower income levels increase both eligibility 
for means-tested benefits and the value of the 
credit received via the EITC. Figure 11 shows 
clearly that in addition to a significant impact 
of benefits, Hispanic households at the 20th and 
30th percentiles appear to receive a significantly 
larger boost from tax credits then either white or 
non-white households. The contrast with white 
households is simply a function of many white 
households, even those near the 20th percentile, 
having incomes that put them above the threshold 
of eligibility for the EITC. The contrast with non-
white households is more troubling. Despite 
having similar income levels at the 20th and 
30th percentiles, Hispanic households received 
substantially larger benefits by way of tax credits. 
While it is not possible here to disentangle the 
various potential contributions of unemployment, 
family size, and household composition to these 
differences, it likely that the significantly higher 
rates of unemployment among African-Americans 
contributes substantially to this difference (by 
reducing receipt of earning conditional tax credits).   
Overall, in terms of total income losses, non-
white households with middling incomes have 
been hit the hardest even more than very poor 
households. These households, those between the 
40th and 60th percentiles in the distribution of 
non-white households, experienced these losses 
as the combined result of both larger proportional 
losses in earnings and the receipt of less relief from 
benefits and tax credits. These lower-to-middle class 
minority households have found themselves both 
disproportionately impacted by poor labor market 
conditions and less able to access income supports 
via safety-net programs than either white or 
Hispanic households. In addition, regardless of race 
or ethnicity, very poor households also experienced 
substantial reductions in total household incomes. 
However, the receipt of benefits and transfers 
obscures the fact that earnings losses were 
dramatically larger as a proportion of total income 
for very poor non-white households. In the context 
of nearly unprecedented levels of both under and 
unemployment among lower income households, 
it is important to underline the disproportionate 
intensity of this experience among poor minority 
households.         
Family Structure 
Single-mothers often face multiple barriers to 
labor force participation and, consequently, are 
more likely to reply upon benefits and transfers to 
supplement their earnings. In order to examine 
both the impact of the recession and benefits/
credits for these households, Figure 14 displays 
the changes in income with and in the absence of 
benefits and credits for female-headed households 
with children. The estimated incomes for a female-
headed household of three at various percentiles 
are available in Table 3.  As with the previous 
figures presenting changes in income along racial/
ethnic lines, the 10th percentile is omitted due to 
the fact that earnings losses at the 10th percentile 
dwarf those at higher percentiles. A female-headed 
household of three at the 10th percentile earned 
roughly	$1400	in	market	income	in	2007;	by	2009	
this had fallen to about $75 for the entire year. With 
benefits and credits the same household’s total 
income was $8171 in 2007 and $7675 in 2009.  This 
constitutes a 5.9% decrease in total income, as 
compared to a 95% decrease in market income. 
Similarly, a household at the 20th percentile 
experienced a 23% decrease in earnings, but only a 
5.6% decline in total household income. Above the 
20th percentile it appears that the overall impact of 
benefits and credits has been to create a remarkable 
degree of economic stability for female-headed 
households between the 30th and 80th percentiles 
with incomes remaining essentially unchanged 
between 2007 and 2009.
Let’s examine the experiences of the poorest of these 
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TABLE 3 Total Income for a Female-Headed Household of Three with Children  
(2010 dollars; Householder Age 25–59)
Income Income   Total Income
Percentile Year
 Without Benefits/
Credits
With Benefits
 (With Benefits/
Credits)
10th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$1,400
$848
$75
$122
 $7,297
$7,245
$6,992
$6,041
$8,171
$8,218
$7,685
20th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$9,212
$8,268
$7,095
$6,000
$13,165
$12,640
$12,362
$11,329
$15,574
$14,790
$14,689
30th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$15,688
$14,964
$13,231
$12,350
$18,447
$18,130
$17,344
$16,896
$21,507
$21,089
$21,350
40th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$21,789
$20,739
$19,542
$19,053
$24,203
$23,815
$22,917
$22,413
$27,226
$26,550
$27,441
50th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$28,120
$26,758
$25,852
$25,400
$30,190
$29,725
$29,319
$28,276
$32,501
$31,829
$32,500
60th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$36,027
$34,819
$33,626
$32,840
$37,915
$37,164
$36,659
$35,421
$38,317
$37,251
$38,264
70th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$44,869
$43,728
$43,172
$41,643
$46,341
$45,896
$46,122
$44,301
$45,341
$44,478
$45,758
80th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$57,371
$56,229
$55,002
$54,121
 $58,769
$58,445
$58,152
$56,426
$55,332
$54,790
$55,669
90th 2007
2008
2009
2010
$77,465
$78,421
$77,504
$75,000
$79,588
$81,269
$80,707
$78,389
$72,290
$73,101
$73,903
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households first.  Figure 15 presents the percent of 
total income received from various programs and 
credits by the bottom 20% of working-age female-
headed households with children in 2007 and 2009. 
Programs omitted from Figure 15 contributed less 
than 1% of total income received. The first thing 
to note is that total income from earnings in these 
lower-income female-headed households fell from 
over a third to just over a quarter of total income 
in 2009. Over the same years the total proportion 
of income received through benefits and transfers 
grew from roughly 55% to 60%. As the majority of 
income was already comprised of benefits/credits 
rather small increases in the share of income 
from benefits compensated heavily for decreases 
in earnings, which constitute a relatively small 
proportion of all income. A household at the ten 
percentile may have lost the majority of its earnings, 
but this impact is muted, given that earnings 
comprised only 17% of all income in 2007. 
Figure 15 indicates that for these female-headed 
households the vast majority of benefits (and the 
majority of all income) were received through 
five sources: Social Security, TANF, SSI, UI, and 
federal tax credits, primarily the EITC. Despite the 
substantial reductions in earnings experienced 
by these households essentially the only program 
for which benefits have expanded significantly is 
Unemployment Insurance, which increased more 
than five-fold. Income received from the EITC 
fell 22% as labor force participation has declined. 
However, total income from federal tax credits was 
stable as a number of temporary tax credits filled 
the gap. Total income from TANF actually declined 
slightly between 2007 and 2009. Not to belabor the 
point, but it is rather incredible that in the context 
of a recession of this magnitude this program has 
been so unresponsive to the economic conditions 
of the program’s target population, poor women 
with children. This is consistent with work that has 
argued that the counter cyclical nature of “welfare” 
funding was fundamentally altered as a result of the 
1996	welfare	reform	(Bentele	&	Nicoli	forthcoming;	
Soss	et	al.	2011;	Danzinger	2010).	Multiple	features	
of TANF, especially lifetime limits and work 
requirements, constrain the responsiveness of this 
program to increased need.
Finally, focusing on sources of income alone ignores 
the contribution of a program that is increasingly 
critical to the economic well being of lower-income 
families, SNAP. Figure 16 examines the contribution 
of various benefits and transfer to the bottom 20% 
Figure 14. Change in Income for Female-Headed Households with Children: 2007–2009 
(Householder Age 25-59)
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of female-headed households and is identical to 
Figure 15 except that it considers SNAP benefits as 
income. SNAP benefits comprised 20% of household 
income in 2007 and 26% by 2009. As stated earlier 
it is difficult to overemphasize how substantial a 
role SNAP has come to play in supplementing the 
budgets of lower-income households, especially 
those of single mothers.   
Looking back for a moment at Figure 14, what 
about those middle-income female-headed 
households that experienced such stable incomes 
over the initial years of the recession? How was that 
accomplished? Figure 17 presents the percentage 
of income received via benefits and transfers for 
female-headed households within the middle 
quintile of female-headed households. For a family 
of three this includes households where household 
incomes fall between the 40th and 60th percentiles, 
ranging from roughly $27,000 to $38,000 year. 
Within these households, UI benefits have expanded 
the most, more than doubling between 2007 and 
2009. That said, UI benefits comprised only 2% of 
total income in 2009. The largest source of support 
for these households came from federal tax credits, 
which comprised 12% of total income in 2009. The 
total share from this source increased 36% between 
2007 and 2009. Roughly half of this increase is 
attributable to increases in the receipt of funds via 
the EITC, presumably as more household incomes 
either fell into the range of eligibility for the credit 
or received a larger credit as earnings fell. Less 
than 1% of all income received by these households 
comes from TANF, but it is noteworthy that this 
small proportion of income did increase 45% 
between 2007 and 2009. Finally, we stressed the role 
of SNAP for lower income households. Use of SNAP 
has increased among these lower-middle class 
households as well. SNAP benefits comprised 3.8% 
of total household income in 2009 double the share 
in 2007 (not shown). 
The experiences of female-headed households 
present a mixed picture in terms of the accessibility 
and responsiveness of the contemporary safety net. 
For working-age female-headed households with 
children at the 30th percentile and above, safety-
net programs and tax credits have very successfully 
provided stability in household incomes during the 
first two years of the recession. A female-headed 
family of three at the 30th percentile earned 
$15,688 in 2007 and $13,231 in 2009.  For these 
poor households and for much better off middle 
and upper-middle class female-headed families, it 
appears that income supports have very effectively 
replaced lost earnings between 2007 and 2009. On 
the other hand, the only female-headed households 
for which this is not the case are extremely poor 
female-headed households at or below the 20th 
percentile. A female-headed household of three 
at	the	20th	percentile	in	2007	earned	$9,212;	a	
household at the 10th percentile earned only $1,400. 
As a result of low labor force participation and 
earnings, these households were heavily reliant on 
benefits and credits in both 2007 and 2009. These 
benefits and credits have significantly buffered 
earnings losses for these very poor households, 
however these income supports did not expand 
enough to completely offset substantial losses. 
The primary reason for this specific divergence in 
the experiences of working poor female-headed 
households, versus that of very poor female-headed 
households, is attributable primarily to differential 
Figure 15. Percent of Total Income from Various 
Benefits and Credits: Bottom 20% of 
Female-Headed Households with Children, 
2007 and 2009 (Householder Age 25-59)
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receipt of earnings conditional tax credits. A 
comparison of the impact of tax credits on total 
earnings losses for female-headed households 
at the 30th and 20th percentile in Figure 14, 
illustrates these differences clearly. For working 
class and middle class female-headed households, 
a combination of benefits and tax credits have 
largely filled the gap created by earnings losses, in 
some cases in roughly equal proportions. On the 
other hand, very poor female-headed households 
have, on average, experienced declining access 
to employment conditional subsidies, such as the 
EITC, and no increases in cash assistance via TANF. 
For these households, increases in income support 
since the onset of the recession have been received 
largely through SNAP and UI benefits for those 
who were eligible. However, these analyses do not 
adequately convey the depth of poverty currently 
experienced by many poor single mothers. Loprest 
& Nichols (2011) estimate that one in four single 
mothers below 200% of the poverty line received 
both no earnings and no cash assistance (that is, 
no TANF or SSI benefits) in 2009. Such households 
fall below the 10th percentile in these analyses, and 
their extreme levels of deprivation offer a sobering 
contrast to the effectiveness of safety net programs 
in stabilizing the incomes of more economically 
fortunate female-headed households.        
Location 
Benefits	and	credits	received	through	the	federal	
tax code or through federal programs such as 
Social Security or SSI generally have uniform 
benefits structures and eligibility requirements. 
Consequently, both the impact and accessibility of 
these programs for eligible individuals tend to be 
relatively consistent across the country. In contrast, 
a number of programs vary significantly in both 
their eligibility standards and benefit amounts 
at the state level. This is especially the case for 
state TANF and UI programs. Further, most states 
supplement the value of federal SSI benefits to 
varying degrees. In addition, 23 states and D.C. 
provide a state earned income tax credit. As UI and 
TANF are the two safety net programs that exhibit 
the strongest degree of variation in accessibility, 
Figures 18 and 19 illustrate state-level variation 
in UI and TANF coverage. UI coverage refers 
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to the percentage of the unemployed who were 
receiving UI payments in 2009. Nationally 63% of 
the unemployed were receiving UI benefits in 2009, 
but at the state level coverage ranged from the low 
thirties to the mid-90s. The TANF coverage measure 
provided in Figure 19 is a ratio of the number of 
child TANF cases over the number of poor children 
in the state. The variability in TANF coverage is 
extreme, ranging from under 5% to 60%.   
In order to roughly characterize state safety net 
accessibility I average UI and TANF coverage rates. 
Grouping states using this index, Figure 20 displays 
the change in total income for households in the 
20 least accessible states7 and households in the 20 
most accessible states8. Households at the median 
and below in both groups of states experienced 
very similar proportional losses in market incomes 
between 2007 and 2009. However, despite very 
similar declines in earnings the experiences 
of lower-income and poor households were 
dramatically different depending on the degree of 
safety net accessibility in their state of residence. 
This divergence is most striking for households at 
the 10th percentile where total income losses were 
roughly 7% in the states characterized by low safety 
Figure 20. Household Income Losses by Safety-Net Accessibility in State of Residence 
(Householder Age 25-59)
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net accessibility as compared to losses of just over 
1%	in	state	with	more	accessible	programs.	Between	
the 30th and 60th percentiles income losses are 
larger in less accessible states, but the differences at 
some points, such as the 30th and 50th percentiles, 
are minor. Overall, with the sole exception of the 
90th percentile, these smaller losses in states with 
more accessible safety nets are attributable to the 
impacts of benefits and credits. Although it should 
be noted that, at the 70th percentile and above, 
the fact that total losses are smaller in states with 
more accessible programs is attributable to both 
smaller declines in earnings and a larger impact of 
benefits and credits. Returning to the surprisingly 
large difference in the magnitude of change in 
household incomes for very poor households at the 
10th percentile, Figure 21 displays the contribution 
of benefits and credits to these divergent outcomes. 
Despite slightly larger declines in earnings 
experienced by poor households in more accessible 
states, the generosity and accessibility of both 
benefits and credits in these states compensate for 
nearly all lost earnings.   
This raises the question: what programs or credits 
are most responsible for these observed cross-state 
differences? Figure 22 compares the contributions 
of various programs and credits to total incomes 
in households below the national 20th percentile 
within either the 20 states with the most accessible 
safety net programs or the 20 states with the least 
accessible programs. Lower-income households 
in states with more accessible programs received 
more income from SSI, UI, TANF, and state tax 
credits. In the case of SSI this is likely a result of 
larger	state	supplements	to	SSI	payments;	the	
average per recipient expenditure on SSI is higher 
in more accessible states. However, it should be 
stated that this is a rough comparison and some 
portion of the difference between these sets of 
states is attributable to differences in the size of the 
population of non-elderly state residents eligible 
for SSI. Otherwise, the share of income from UI 
received in more accessible states was 30% larger 
and the share of income from TANF was over 
three times larger than that in states with less 
accessible programs. Shares of income from SNAP 
were essentially the same within the two sets of 
states (not shown). Substantial differences in the 
generosity and accessibility of a small number of 
programs (SSI, UI, and especially TANF) appear to 
drive the significantly different degrees to which 
state safety net programs have mitigated earnings 
losses for very poor households.        
Summary
Overall, the primary programs that have bolstered 
the incomes of poorer households in the initial years 
of the recession are Unemployment Insurance, a 
number of temporary federal tax cuts and credits, 
and in some states (to a much lesser extent) TANF. 
Additionally, considering SNAP benefits income, 
these benefits have become a major source of 
income support. Repeatedly, the experiences of 
particular types of households has highlighted 
the limits on the extent to which employment 
conditional benefits, such as the EITC and in some 
cases TANF, can reach very poor households in 
the context of a prolonged employment crisis. This 
problem is especially acute for very poor female-
headed households and for non-white households. 
Finally, it is clear that access to the support 
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Figure 22. Percent of Total Income from Various 
Benefits and Credits: Bottom 20% of Household 
by State Safety Net Accessibility 
(Householder Age 25-59)
Fed Tax
Credits
(Including
EITC)
EITC
Social
Security
SSI
UI
TANF
State Tax
Credits
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Evaluating the Performance of the U.S. Social Safety Net in the Great Recession 25
provided by safety 
net programs, 
especially UI 
and TANF, is not 
uniform across 
states.   
With these 
important qualifiers 
in mind, looking 
back at Figures 1 
& 2 it is clear that 
while the total 
income losses 
experienced by very 
poor households 
are undoubtedly 
painful, these 
losses pale in 
comparison to the 
losses that would 
have occurred 
in the absence 
of benefits and 
credits. While access is uneven and benefits are 
often extremely meager, it remains the case that the 
combined impact of various safety net programs 
have substantially reduce the volatility of household 
incomes during the recession. However, I also 
expect the capacity of existing programs to mitigate 
income losses to falter substantially and potentially 
disastrously in coming years. My pessimism is 
based on two factors: the dramatic erosion of labor 
force participation among low-income households 
and the exhaustibility of the programs that have 
expanded the most between 2007 and 2009.
Reduced Labor Force Participation in Lower-
Income Households
This first development requires some elaboration. 
In addition to the unemployment rate, many 
observers have urged more attention be paid to 
the significant declines in the employment-to-
population ratio which has fallen to levels not 
see since the early 1980s. The employment-to-
population ratio captures changes in labor force 
participation that may not be reflected in the 
unemployment rate, due to the manner in which 
workers who have dropped out of the labor force 
are not counted as unemployed in the most widely 
used unemployment measure. In addition, I would 
stress that reductions in labor force participation 
have been the most severe among lower-income 
households. Figure 23 displays the average annual 
hours worked for working-age households in the 
bottom 20% of households and the bottom 10% of 
households (in terms of adjusted incomes) between 
1979 and 2010. The average work hours among these 
households are significantly lower than households 
at higher points in the income distribution.  For 
comparison, one person working full-time generally 
logs roughly 2,000 hours in a year. As Kenworthy 
(2011) emphasizes, following the recessions in the 
early 1980s and 1990s it took essentially the entire 
business cycle for work hours for lower income 
households to recover to their pre-recession 
levels. In the “jobless recovery” following the 2001 
recession, work hours for lower-income households 
were essentially flat and then reduced further when 
hit by the 2007-2009 recession.
It is hard to exaggerate how devastating this 
recession has been for the employment prospects 
of low-income households. In 2010 average annual 
hours in the bottom 10% of working-age households 
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fell to 139 hours for the entire year, while 
the average within the bottom 20% of 
households fell to 864 hours. This is a 
result of both reduced working hours 
and a dramatic expansion of the share 
of households in the bottom 10% with 
zero working hours all year, which 
jumped from 46% to 63% between 2007 
and 2009. Such reductions in labor force 
participation among poor households 
are unprecedented in recent historical 
memory. Further, as of 2010 the decline 
in working hours continued a year after 
the official end of the recession. Even in 
the context of traditional “V-shaped” 
recessions the recovery of work hours 
among lower-income households is often 
extremely slow. As of 2010, losses in work 
hours for lower-income households have 
not even plateaued, let alone begun to 
recover. This suggests that recovery of lost 
earnings will be many years off for a large 
segment of lower-income households. 
Worse, the most recent recessions, 
which Paul Krugman has referred to 
as “post-modern” recessions, have been 
characterized by trends of brutally slow recovery 
of both employment and work hours, especially for 
less educated workers. If the current recovery is 
anything like the recovery from the 2001 recession 
(and all indications so far suggest that it is) then the 
employment prospects for lower-income households 
will be bleak for many years to come.
Exhaustibility of Primary Income Supports 
 This economic outlook is troubling in and 
of itself, however the situation looks alarming when 
considering that the primary programs that have 
compensated for earnings losses in recent years are 
ill-suited to the both the magnitude and the long-
term nature of the current employment crisis. As 
Figure 24. "Welfare" Coverage: Ratio of Number of Children Receiving TANF or 
SSP/Number of Poor Children, 1998-2010
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we saw above, income received through the EITC 
has fallen for lower-income households as they have 
fallen out of the labor market. In the short-term a 
number of temporary federal tax cuts have filled 
the gap, especially the 2008/9 Economic Stimulus 
Payments and the 2009/10 Making Work Pay Tax 
Credit. However, these credits have now expired. 
The payroll tax cut (which was passed in late 2010, 
received over the course of 2011, and recently 
extended through 2012) is helpful but provides 
more assistance to those with more earnings 
and, importantly, only to those who actually have 
earnings. 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
While total income received from TANF by 
lower-income female-headed households has not 
expanded in response to the recession, income 
from this program remains a significant source of 
income for many of these households, especially in 
states with more accessible TANF programs. Figure 
24 displays a measure of national TANF coverage, 
the ratio of the number of child TANF or SSP9 
cases over the number of poor children, between 
1998 and 2010. There has been a steady decline in 
TANF coverage since the 1996 reform and coverage 
has remained essentially flat since the onset of 
the recession. TANF has not been completely 
unresponsive, cases have increased, but not at a rate 
sufficient to increase the percentage of 
poor children covered as more children 
have fallen into poverty.  Figure 25 
illustrates this increase in cases for 
all recipients and child cases, but also 
indicates that the total number of cases 
has essentially plateaued since late-
2009. Figures for the first half of 2011 
indicate that the national caseload has 
remained stable, but poverty rates will 
undoubtedly have continued to increase 
in 2011.   
While there is a great deal of variation in 
the implementation of TANF programs 
at the state-level, an important feature 
of the 1996 reform was a lifetime limit of 
five years of benefit receipt. In 2008, 17 
states had lifetime limits shorter than 
this federal maximum and a couple 
of states have shortened their time limits in 2011. 
Additionally, six states reduced the value of their 
TANF benefits in 2011 (Schott & Pavetti 2011). These 
features and trends do not bode well for either the 
accessibility and adequacy of TANF benefits in 
coming years, or the poor single mothers in these 
particular states.
Unemployment Insurance    
In terms of compensating for lost earnings, UI has, 
by far, done the most heavy lifting since the onset 
of the recession. This fact alone is concerning given 
that state UI systems are simply not designed to 
handle an employment crisis of this magnitude. 
As of early 2011, 30 states had exhausted their UI 
funds and have been borrowing from the federal 
government to pay UI claims (Prah 2011). In 2011, 
10 states introduced new UI eligibility restrictions 
and	reduced	benefits;	another	6	states	reduced	the	
length of benefit receipt below the long-standing 
26-week period (Kahan & Wentworth 2011). Federal 
extensions of UI claims from the usual 26-weeks 
of benefits to 99-weeks have been critical to 
maintaining income support through UI. Figure 
26 displays the national UI coverage, or recipiency, 
rates for UI Regular programs (the normal state 26-
week programs) and “all programs” which includes 
federally funded UI extensions. Since mid-2010 
the share of the unemployed receiving UI benefits 
■ All Programs   ■ Regular Programs
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has been declining.  This is likely primarily due 
to recipients exhausting benefits, but a portion is 
also attributable to individuals joining the ranks 
of the unemployed who do not qualify for UI, such 
as individuals with unstable work arrangements or 
individuals entering the labor market who were not 
previously employed, such as graduating students. 
Given the structure of UI systems, there is no 
mechanism by which this program can reach 
the unemployed who did not qualify for benefits 
upon losing their job or those who have exhausted 
their benefits. UI benefits are often inaccessible to 
individuals who have lost part-time jobs, lost jobs 
in a manner that disqualifies them from receipt of 
benefits, or lost a job that was not held long enough 
to gain eligibility for benefits. Additionally, unlike 
many means-tested benefits, once exhausted 
UI benefits cannot be received again until the 
individual in question has found employment for 
a considerable period. All of these features limit 
the ability of UI systems to expand to meet the 
current level of need for income support.  Further, 
the exhaustibility of UI benefits ensures that the 
very significant buffering of earnings losses that has 
been accomplished via UI programs will continue to 
erode over time.     
The Years Ahead
Looking back at Figure 23 for a moment, it is 
not far-fetched to expect that the employment 
and earnings situation of many very low-income 
households will not have recovered at all in the next 
two and possibly three years, six to seven years after 
the onset of the recession. Many of these families 
have long since spend down their assets, if they had 
any to begin with, and rely heavily on the various 
income supports for which they are eligible. We 
are currently in the early years of a slow rolling 
crisis in which a significant fraction of American 
households will either fall into, or fall deeper, 
into poverty as they exhaust various benefits. In 
the absence of these more exhaustible benefits, 
specifically UI, TANF, and temporary tax credits, 
the national poverty rate in 2009 would have been 
roughly 2 percentage points higher, just over 16%. 
In 2010, ignoring the role of tax credits, the poverty 
rate would have been nearly 17% (as opposed to 
Figure 27. Actual Household Income Losses and Losses in the Absence of UI, TANF, 
and Temporary Tax Credits in 2009
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15.1%) in the absence of UI and TANF benefits. Of 
course, these rough estimates overstate the actual 
degree of poverty we might expect in coming years 
as changes in who is unemployed and who is eligible 
for benefits will ensure that some lower income 
households will be receiving benefits at any future 
date. Regardless, it is safe to say that in the absence 
of a dramatic improvement in the unemployment 
rate many low-income households will fall into 
poverty or near poverty as their exhaustible benefits 
expire.
Further, simply looking at the proportion of 
households that slip under the poverty line misses 
both the broad impacts of benefit expiration for 
a wide swath of the population and the increased 
intensity of poverty for households already below 
the poverty line.  Figure 27 compares the actual 
change in household incomes at various percentiles 
with the change that would have occurred in a 
hypothetical absence of all exhaustible benefits 
(again, UI, TANF, and temporary tax credits) in 
2009. Total income for a family of three at the 10th 
percentile would have been $17,170 as opposed to 
$19,385.  At the 20th percentile, incomes would 
have been $29,256 as compared to $31,292. The 
degree to which these programs have mitigated 
income losses is substantial and the loss of these 
benefits in coming years will significantly impact 
household incomes. Finally, attention to the poverty 
rate alone obscures the severity of the economic 
conditions experienced by families below the 
poverty line.  Measures of the depth of poverty, 
which characterize how far households fall below 
the poverty line during a spell of poverty, have 
been rising steadily for decades. The recession has 
exacerbated this trend and in 2010 44.3% of the 
poor had incomes below half of the poverty line (EPI 
2011). That’s an incredible 20.5 million Americans. 
To put such deprivation in perspective, a family of 
three below half of the poverty line in 2010 had an 
annual income of less than $8,687.        
It is true that as families exhaust benefits such as UI 
or TANF that they may become (or remain) eligible 
for particular means-tested benefits such as SNAP, 
Medicaid, or programs such as SSI if they qualify. 
Overall however, the decreasing accessibility of 
support in the form of direct income in combination 
with increases in the proportion of benefits that 
are “in-kind” presents multiple challenges for poor 
and near poor families as you cannot, for example, 
pay	the	rent	or	utilities	with	an	EBT	card.	Further,	
the shift in recent decades to heavier reliance on 
employment conditional programs also creates 
problems of safety net access for very poor families, 
again, especially in the context of a period of 
enduring high unemployment. In an odd way, the 
focus on earnings conditional supports in recent 
decades has made the U.S. safety net more robust 
for the working poor, but has simultaneously 
substantially reduced the accessibility of safety 
net benefits for the very poor. The severity and 
duration of the current employment crisis has 
exacerbated this rather critical shortcoming of the 
contemporary American safety net.
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1.   All household income figures are adjusted for household 
size using an adjustment called an equivalence scale in 
which total household income is divided by the square 
root	of	household	members		(Kenworthy	2004;	Atkinson,	
Rainwater, and Smeeding 1995). Given that households 
of different sizes will have different income needs, total 
income is divided by this transformation of the number 
of household members. The reason for transforming the 
denominator in this manner is based on the assumption 
that a household of four, for example, is not expected to 
need four times as much income as a household of one 
(due to economies of scale). Consequently, the changes 
in household incomes reported are changes in household 
income per (equivalent) person. Data for these figures 
is drawn from the 2008-2011 March Current Population 
Survey data via the IPUMS project (King et al. 2011).
2.  It is important to keep in mind that these figures are not 
based on changes in the incomes of the same households 
over time. Rather changes displayed are in the value of 
income received by households at various fixed positions 
in the overall income distribution. For example, the change 
in household income at the 50th percentile provides the 
percent change in the value of the median household 
income between 2007 and 2009.
3.  It is clearly the case that in a real life absence of benefits 
individual behavior would likely change.  Elderly 
individuals might continue working or move in with 
their	children	in	the	absence	of	Social	Security	payments;	
disabled individuals might attempt the same in the absence 
of	support;	or	lacking	unemployment	insurance	a	jobless	
individual might take any job available, as opposed to 
waiting to land a job in their field.
4.  The remainder is from child support, loans, alimony, gifts 
and etc.
5.  For convenience I will refer to these as “non-white 
households” instead of “households where the household 
head is non-white”. Additionally, to reduce confusion white 
non-Hispanic households will be referred to as “white 
households”.
6.  Households between the 40th and 60th percentile.
7.  In order from least to more accessible, these 20 states were: 
Texas, South Dakota, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Mississippi, 
Alabama, Utah, Colorado, Virginia, Georgia, Florida, 
North Dakota, South Carolina, Arizona, Kentucky, Illinois, 
Missouri, North Carolina, Wyoming, and Idaho.
8.  In order from less to most accessible, these 20 states were: 
Indiana, Michigan, Delaware, Montana, New Mexico, 
New York, Alaska, New Hampshire, Iowa, Pennsylvania, 
Connecticut, Vermont, New Jersey, Wisconsin, Hawaii, 
Maine, Oregon, Massachusetts, California, and 
Washington.
9.  SSP refers to Separate State Programs, which are TANF-
like state programs which states may funds on their own 
initiative.
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